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The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern 
Front, 1914–1917, by David R� Stone� Lawrence: 
Univ� Press of Kansas, 2015� 368 pages� $34�95 
(Kindle $19�99)�
With the centennial of World War I, 
interested readers can choose from 
among a surging wave of new books 
about the World War I experience and 
its impact on modern history� Most 
of these have focused on the western 
front, but a small number reexamine the 
war in Eastern Europe� Among these, 
David Stone’s The Russian Army in the 
Great War is the first new historical 
overview of the Russian military on the 
eastern front since Norman Stone’s The 
Eastern Front, 1914–1917 was published 
forty years ago� With the fall of the 
Soviet Union, historians have enjoyed 
more access to Russian archives and 
accounts of the war� While this new 
research is already familiar to specialists, 
Stone sets out to make it accessible to 
the general reader� He is clear from 
the outset that his work is a military 
history, so while social and economic 
factors frame military operations, they 
are not the focus of the volume�
Most general histories of World War I 
describe the Russian army in a narrative 
of failure� The “Russian steamroller,” 
feared by its adversaries for its huge but 
slow-to-mobilize peasant armies, fails 
owing to poor leadership and equip-
ment, setting the stage for chaos and 
revolution� While conceding the Russian 
army’s failings, Stone asserts that 
focusing solely on the negative ignores 
essential historical context� Four empires 
(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and 
the Ottoman Empire) went to war in 
Eastern Europe—and none of their royal 
houses survived the experience� All four 
empires experienced military failure, 
hunger, economic and social collapse, 
and loss of territory� The Russian 
experience was unique only in that the 
subsequent civil war led to an enduring 
Communist regime� On the battlefield, 
Russian troops generally performed 
as well as the Austro-Hungarian units 
that were their primary adversaries 
in the first half of the war� Only when 
fighting German troops were Russian 
units clearly outclassed� Stone observes, 
however, that no nation consistently 
matched the quality of the German army 
on a unit-against-unit basis� The Russian 
army was plagued by a lack of artillery, 
machine guns, and ammunition—as 
was every army in the war� No military 
had anticipated fully the requirements 
of modern industrial warfare, and 
entire societies were mobilized to meet 
these sudden demands, with varying 
degrees of success� Russia’s industrial 
mobilization was less successful than 
some, but what success it achieved 
was notable considering the country’s 
relatively backward starting point�
The Russian army’s first moves in the 
war are remembered for the defeat 
of two Russian armies at the battle of 
Tannenberg—often the only eastern 
front battle nonspecialists can name� 
Tannenberg has been remembered in 
part because the two victorious Ger-
man commanders, Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff, later emerged to lead the 
overall German war effort� Less appreci-
ated is that at the same time the Russian 
army achieved significant initial success 
against Austria-Hungary� These territo-
rial gains were reversed in 1915, as the 
Russian army endured the series of de-
feats known as “the long retreat�” Despite 
this reversal, however, the Russian army 
remained intact and effective� In 1916, it 
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launched major offensives, coordinated 
with its allies, to divert German forces 
from combat on the western front� In the 
process, the Russian army pushed deep 
into Austria-Hungary and essentially 
removed the Austro-Hungarian army 
from the war as an effective fighting 
force� Subsequent Austrian resistance 
would continue only because of direct 
support by German army units�
Readers generally familiar with the war 
on the eastern front will enjoy Stone’s 
coverage of campaigns in the Carpathi an 
Mountains and on the Turkish front, as 
well as the disastrous impact on Russia 
of Romanian entry into the war on the 
Allied side� Stone’s previous research 
on the early Soviet military allows 
him to identify continuity between 
the imperial and Soviet militaries and 
frame how the new Soviet army drew 
lessons from World War I combat�
Combat on the eastern front was more 
mobile than the trench warfare in the 
west� This is a story in which terrain 
matters, and most of it is not familiar� 
In this context, the book suffers from 
the generally low quality of its maps�
For the reader already versed in the 
events of late imperial Russian history, 
The Russian Army in the Great War 
fills a gap by explaining the nuances 
of military events� If, however, these 
events are unfamiliar, or if the reader 
is more interested in the interplay of 
military, economic, and social fac-
tors, a broader history of Russia 
in World War I, such as W� Bruce 
Lincoln’s Passage through Armageddon, 
would be a better starting point�
DALE C� RIELAGE
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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